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Abstract
Following Obergefell v. Hodges, same-sex marriage remains controversial and anti-LGBT state
legislation has been passed, which raises questions about whether the Supreme Court’s ruling
may have created a backlash. We use data from two waves of a general population survey of
Nebraskans conducted before and after the decision to answer three questions. First, we test three
theories of how the Court decision influenced public opinion. We find that support for same-sex
marriage was significantly higher following the ruling, suggesting that there was not a backlash
to it. Second, we assess whether people perceive that the court accurately reflects the public’s
opinion. We find that people who favor same-sex marriage are more likely to think that the
ruling refects public opinion very well; those who oppose same-sex marriage are more likely to
think that the ruling does not at all reflect public opinion. Third, we examine the association
between discussing gay rights and support for same-sex marriage, finding that those who talk
about LGB issues very often are more likely to favor same-sex marriage. We discuss the
implications of these findings in relation to two of the themes of this special issue: the influence
of marriage equality on Americans’ understandings of marriage and the impact of marriage
equality on future LGBT activism.
Keywords: same-sex marriage, public opinion, lesbian and gay movement, backlash, law
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Introduction
The issue of same-sex marriage has been a greatly debated and contested topic in the
United States (Hopkins et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2010; Stone, 2012). Prior to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in June 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges, that extended the recognition of same-sex
marriage to the entire country, scholars addressed a range of facets relating to the topic,
including but not limted to: how marriage become a focal point in LGBT activism and how the
achievement of marriage would affect such activism (Fetner, 2008; Hull, 2006; Kimport 2014;
Richman 2014), debate within gay and lesbian communities about the desirability of marriage
(Bernstein and Taylor, 2013; Ettlebrick, 1997; Stoddard, 1997), and how visibility and
recognition of same-sex marriage impacts public understandings of marriage and family
(Badgett, 2010; Powell et al., 2010).
The inquiry about if and how recognition of same-sex marriage may change Americans’
understandings about marriage and family mirrors questions about the relationship between
Supreme Court decisions and public opinion, which have also garnered much attention among
researchers. Research has shown both that Court rulings do and do not affect public opinion
(Hoekstra and Segal, 1996; Rosenberg, 1991). Some work illustrates that following a widely
publicized and visible decision dealing with a controversial issue, polarization might occur,
which entails some groups’ opinions becoming more positive about the issue and some groups’
opinions becoming more negative (i.e. backlash) (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989). Arguably, the
Obergefell v. Hodges can be considered one of many very visible cases dealing with a
controversial topic. Moreover, since the ruling, some states have passed legislation that
negatively impacts LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals (Bauerlein and
Kamp, 2016), which raises questions about whether the ruling on marriage created a backlash in
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terms of public opinion on other LGB issues. People might also view the Court decision as
ushering in social change that is not aligned with what the majority of Americans want, which
could bolster a possibility of backlash (Kazyak, 2011; Parker and Barreto, 2013).
In this article, we synthesize social science literature on public opinion and sexuality to
assess opinion of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues following the achievement of samesex marriage. Specifically, we use data from a general population mail survey of Nebraskans
conducted before and after the Supreme Court decision to examine three questions:
1) How did the Supreme Court ruling Obergefell v. Hodges affect public opinion
of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues?
2) Do people perceive that the court decision accurately reflects the public’s
opinion about same-sex marriage?
3) Are people who talk about gay and lesbian issues more likely to support samesex marriage?
We compare data from waves of the survey conducted in 2013 and 2015 to assess the impact of
the ruling on Nebraskans’ opinions on four LGB issues: same-sex marriage, adoption by gay and
lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from housing and job discrimination.
Our findings shed light on some of the implications of the achievement of same-sex marriage.
We specifically are interested in two of the questions addressed in this special issue: “How has
the achievement of marriage equality influenced public understandings of the institutions of
marriage and family?” and “What impact has the achievement of same-sex marriage had on
LGBT activism, communities and/or identities?” We assess the first question through examining
people’s support for same-sex marriage. We discuss the implications of our findings with regard
to how marriage equality might affect LGBT and anti-LGBT activism given both the general
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public’s views on LGB issues and their discussion of these issues. Nebraska serves as an
illustrative case study to examine these questions insofar as the state is more politically
conversative than the national average and thus may be a context where backlash is more likely
to occur.

Literature Review
Public Opinion Formation: Communication, False Consensus, and the Court
Social scientists have addressed the myriad of factors that influence how people form
opinions about social issues. Three factors in particular inform our analyses: communication,
false consensus, and the Supreme Court. Scholars note how forming an opinion on a public issue
is a process, not something that is straightforward or taken-for granted. Indeed, people form
opinions in interactions and dialogues with others and engagement with media (Christen &
Gunther, 2003; Eveland & Scheufele, 2001; Hoffman et al., 2007; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995;
Moy, Domke & Stamm, 2001). In this way, scholars note that processes of communication are
important in forming an opinion about a public issue, which is why we address whether people
discuss gay rights (Hypothesis 3). With respect to same-sex marriage, Michelson and Harrison
(2017) argue that when a person engages in dialogue and interactions with another whom she
respects and sees as like her, her opinions are likely to shift to align with theirs. For instance,
they note that if a Republican-identified person sees other Republicans express support for samesex marriage, that person is likely to adjust their position to also be supportive. The importance
of communication in forming an opinion underscores the degree to which individuals tell stories
as a way to reach a conclusion about controversial social issues (Edgell et al., 2016).
Also of relevance to the current analyses is that researchers have identified the “false
consensus effect” or the fact that people often perceive their own opinions as relatively common
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and perceive opposing opinions as relatively uncommon (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Krueger
and Clement, 1994; Wojcieszak and Price, 2009). For instance, Wojcieszak and Price (2009)
analzyzed public opinion on gun control, the death penalty, and teaching morality in public
schools and found that as individual’s support for these issues increased, so did their pereception
that the public supported these issues. Moreover, they found that “encountering dissimilar
opinions mitigates the association between individual position and perceived public opinion on
the three contentious sociopolitical issues” (p. 39). This finding in conjunction with the emphasis
on communicative processes point to the fact that being in dialogue with people, particular with
people who do not share the same beliefs as you, may lessen the tendency to conflate your
opinion with the opinion of the general population. This literature points to the importance of
asking questions about whether people are discussing same-sex marriage and gay rights issues
(given the emphasis on communication in developing opinion about social issues) and how
people perceive what the public’s opinion is on these issues (given the emphasis on the false
consensus effect); it is from this literature that we have developed our second and third research
questions and hypotheses.
Finally much work has addressed the Supreme Court and its impact on public opinion of
social issues. Findings from the literature examining how Supreme Court decisions affect public
opinion are mixed. For instance, some scholarship indicates that Supreme Court rulings shift
public opinion to align with the Court’s decision (Christenson and Glick, 2015; Flores and
Barclay, 2016; Hoekstra and Segal, 1996). The positive response or legitimacy hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1a) suggests that, because the public views the Supreme Court in high esteem, the
public is likely to respect the Court’s ruling or deem the Court’s ruling as legitimate and adjust
their own opinions accordingly (Dahl, 1957). One recent exemplar that provides evidence for
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this hypothesis is Christenson and Glick (2015), who found increased support for the individual
mandate component of the Affordable Care Act following the Supreme Court’s ruling that
upheld the mandate as constitutional. Work analyzing Supreme Court decisions on desegregation
and interracial marriage show similar findings: that public opinion for both increased following
the rulings (Carroll 2004; Combs and Combs 2003; Erskine 1973).
On the other hand, research also finds that the Court either has no effect on public
opinion (Marshall, 1988; Rosenberg, 1991) or that the rulings do have an impact, but that public
opinion may actually shift in the opposite direction of the Court, reflecting a backlash
(Hypothesis 1b) (Klarman, 2013; Persily, Egan, and Wallsten, 2006). Public opinion on gay
rights, for instance, became more negative following the Supreme Court ruling Lawrence v.
Texas that decriminalized same-sex sex (Engel, 2013). This shift may be explained by the fact
that there was negative media coverage of the ruling, which included a greater focus on the
opinions of those who opposed the ruling, including the dissent by Justice Scalia (HaiderMarkel, 2004; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). In addition, scholars argue that
the degree to which LGB individuals are sexualized leads to less support of LGB rights (Persily,
Egan, and Wallsten, 2006), which may have impacted public opinion following Lawrence v.
Texas given that the case focused on same-sex sexual relations. Other work shows that
individuals may perceive the court as moving “too fast” and being out of synch with public
opinion on contentious social issues including gay rights (Irvine, 2005; Kazyak, 2011; Klarman,
2013). Work that has focused on the impact of Supremt Court rulings on same-sex marriage,
however, has found that no backlash occurred; the public’s support for same-sex marriage did
not decline (Bishin et al. 2015; Flores and Barclay, 2016).
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Yet another perspective argues that Supreme Court rulings will affect the opinions of
groups differently, known as the structural response hypothesis (Hypothesis 1c) (Franklin and
Kosaki, 1989; Scott and Saunders, 2006a). According to this hypothesis, support will increase
among groups that are likely to be predisposed to agree with the Court on a certain issue
following a Court decision. In contrast, for groups that are likely to disagree with the Court on a
certain issue, opposition to that issue among these groups will increase following a Court
decision. Thus, polarization occurs. For instance, following Roe v. Wade, which legalized
abortion, levels of opposition to abortion rose among Catholics (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989;
Johnson and Martin, 1998). Likewise, following the decision that made sodomy laws
unconstitutional (Lawrence v. Texas), women and liberals became more likely to support samesex relations (Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). In addition, following the Iowa
Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage, Democrats were among the groups whose
opinions were more likely to become more supportive of same-sex marriage, while other groups,
including Republicans and Evangelicals, were among those groups whose opinions did not
change or became more negative (Kreitzer, Hamilton and Tolbert, 2014). Given the structural
response hypothesis, it is important to understand which groups have been most and least
supportive of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues.

Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage and LGB Rights
Public support for same-sex marriage has increased in the past decades and a clear
majority of Americans now support same-sex marriage (McCarthy, 2017; Pew Research, 2014).
The increasing public support for same-sex marriage mirrors shifts in Americans’ acceptance of
same-sex sexuality (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Loftus 2001). Public opinion studies, however,
show that levels of support vary among demographic, political, and religious groups (Baunach,
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2012; Lewis, 2003; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison, 2006; Pew Research, 2013a; Powell, Yurk
Quadlin, and Pizmony-Levy, 2015). Consistently, studies find that women, higher educated
people, non-religious individuals, younger generations, and political liberals support same-sex
marriage at higher levels than men, lower educated people, religious individuals, older
generations, and political conservatives (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Brumbaugh et al., 2008;
Galupo and Pearl, 2007; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2005, 2008; Kreitzer, Hamilton, and Tolbert,
2014; Lewis, 2011; Lewis and Gossett, 2008; McCarthy, 2015, 2014; Sherkat, de Vries, and
Creek, 2010; Whitehead, 2010; Woodford et al., 2012). Also, work has shown that heterosexual
people who report having a personal connection to gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals are
more likely to have a positive attitude towards gay rights (Fetner, 2016; Herek, 2002; Herek &
Capitanio, 1996).
Along with assessing public opinion on LGBQ rights and how it varies across groups,
researchers have also discussed the changing social landscape with regard to sexuality more
broadly and the impact that same-sex marriage might have for gay and lesbian couples, activism,
and the general public’s understandings of marriage and family and support for other LGBTQ
rights. Most relevant for our analyses (Hypothesis 1d and 1e), there are competing perspectives
on these questions, with scholars emphasizing what they view as both negative and positive
potential outcomes.
Some scholars, for instance, discuss the possibility that same-sex marriage and increasing
inclusion of LGBQ people into American society could lead to a backlash or a lessening of
support and increasing hositility for LGBTQ rights and people. A backlash could manifest in
different ways: public opinion reported on surveys (how we operationalize it in this paper), an
increase in anti-LGBT groups’ mobilization, the introduction of other anti-LGBT legislation, or
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future Supreme Court cases that rescind LGBTQ rights. Parker and Barreto (2013) outline how
reactionary anti-LGBT activism embodied in the Tea Party and its supporters is undergirded by
certain groups, namely white, middle-class, heterosexual, evangelical Protestant men, feeling a
sense of anxiety over what they view as a “displacement” of their values (p. 30). Anti-LGBT
activists may continue to capitalize on this anxiety and work to make same-sex marriage a
rallying issue to oppose following Obergefell in a similar way that anti-choice activists did with
abortion following Roe v. Wade (Fetner, 2008; Klarman, 2013; Luker, 1984). Additionally, in the
wake of marriage equality, states have introduced and passed laws that provide “religious
exemptions” for certain services and benefits for LGBTQ persons as well as debated so-called
“bathroom bills” that target transgender individuals (Miller 2017). Some argue that the surge in
these laws illustrates a backlash to the Obergefell v. Hodges decision (Bauerlein and Kamp,
2016; Thee-Brenan, 2016). Indeed, scholars contend that the narrow focus on marriage equality
has been detrimental insofar as other LGBTQ and sexual freedom-related issues have received
less attention and thus may garner less support (Pew Research, 2013b; Walters, 2014); and
relatedly, the public may believe that LGB Americans experience full equality and thus may
have less support for other issues that they do not view as being necessary (GLAAD, 2016).
Further, the question of whether business owners should have to provide wedding services for
same-sex couples has garned much media attention following Obergefell v. Hodges. The cases
involving business owners denying services, such as the case that the Supreme Court is hearing
in the fall of 2017 centering a Colorado baker who refused to make a wedding cake for a samesex couple, could be considered a backlash to the decision (Liptak, 2017). Finally, scholars have
argued that same-sex marriage may be detrimental to queer visibility and to the ability to
imagine queer ways of forming relationships (Duggan, 2004; Ettlebrick, 1997).
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In contrast, other scholars point to the rapid pace with which the public has embraced
same-sex marriage (Fetner, 2016). Same-sex marriage has caputpaulted and monopolized the
public’s attention in comparison to other LGB issues (Becker, 2014; Bernstein and Taylor, 2013;
Kimport, 2014). Same-sex marriage has been the token gay rights issue since 2000, with judicial
decisions, elections, and campaign rhetoric basically equating same-sex marriage with gay rights
(Engel, 2013). Given this rhetoric, it may be the case that with marriage equality achieved, the
public will embrace other LGB rights. Studies do indicate increasing public support for policies
protecting LGB people from housing and job discrimination (Becker, 2014; Lax and Phillips,
2009; Lewis and Rogers, 1999). Such work suggests that there may be an increase for LGB
rights among the American public following the Obergefell decision. Additionally, there is some
evidence that Americans have become more inclusive in their understandings of family and
marriage and report more acceptance of same-sex couples (Powell et al, 2010). In this way,
rather than view same-sex marriage as limiting the potential for visibility of queer culture and
people, scholars contend that it may actually increase visibility as well as offer the ability to
transform understandings of marriage (Bernstein, 2015; Green, 2013; Stoddard, 1997).

Hypotheses
Drawing on the literature outlined above, we have the following hypotheses about how
the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling might affect public opinion of same-sex marriage and other LGB
issues:
H1a: The positive response or legitimacy hypothesis suggests that we should expect to
observe an increase in support for same-sex marriage from 2013 to 2015.
H1b: The backlash hypothesis suggests that we should expect to observe a decrease in
support for same-sex marriage from 2013 to 2015.
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H1c: The structural response hypothesis suggests that we should expect to observe an
increase in support from 2013 to 2105 among groups that are more likely to support
same-sex marriage, such as women, Democrats, and less religious individuals and a
decrease in support among groups that are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage,
such as men, Republicans, and religious individuals.
We also draw on literature that discusses changes in attitudes towards LGBTQ rights and people
more broadly and hypothesize:
H1d: We should observe an increase in support for other LGB rights following the 2015
Supreme Court decision.
H1e: We should observe a decrease in support for other LGB rights following the 2015
Supreme Court decision.
Finally, since we are interested in how the decision may impact future activism, examined here
by how the public views the court decision (i.e. if they view it as ushering in social change that is
out of synch with what Americans want, which would bolster the possibility of a backlash) and
whether the public discusses gay rights issues, we offer the following hypotheses:
H2: Given the false consensus effect, we should expect that those who favor same-sex
marriage will believe that the majority of others also favor same-sex marriage; thus, they
should be more likely to perceive that the court decision accurately reflects the public’s
opinion.
H3: Since people form their opinions through interactions and communications with
others, we should expect no difference between those who favor and oppose same-sex
marriage with regard to whether they discuss gay rights.

Methods
12
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Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS)
We analyze data from the 2013 and 2015 waves of the Nebraska Annual Social Indicators
Survey (NASIS). NASIS is an annual, cross-sectional, omnibus survey of Nebraska adults ages
19 and older conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research at the University of NebraskaLincoln. The 2013 NASIS and 2015 NASIS were both mail surveys sent to randomly selected
address-based samples—n=6,000 Nebraska households in 2013 and n=3,500 Nebraska
households in 2015. Survey Sampling International (SSI) provided the address-based samples for
both years. Respondents were selected within sampled households using the next birthday
technique. NASIS 2013 included four mailings (initial survey packet, postcard reminder, and two
replacement survey packets) during its data collection period from June 2013 to August 2014
(NASIS 2012-2013 Methodology Report). NASIS 2015 included three mailings (initial survey
packet, postcard reminder, and a replacement survey packet) during its data collection period
from August 2015 to October 2015 (NASIS 2014-2015 Methodology Report). The initial
mailing of the 2015 NASIS also included a $1 cash incentive. A total of n=1,608 respondents
completed NASIS 2013 for a response rate of 27.3% (American Association for Public Opinion
Research Response Rate 1 [AAPOR RR1]—AAPOR Standard Definitions 2009), and a total of
n=1,143 respondents completed NASIS 2015 for a response rate of 32.7% (AAPOR RR1—
AAPOR Standard Definitions 2009).
NASIS 2013 and NASIS 2015 included the same four questions about LGB issues. The
questions asked respondents whether they favor or oppose: same-sex marriage, adoption by gay
and lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from housing and job
discrimination (see table 1 for question wording). NASIS 2015 also included questions about
how often respondents talked about gay and lesbian issues as well as questions about their
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perception of the Supreme Court decision representing the opinion of a majority of Americans
and a majority of Nebraskans.
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>

Nebraska Context: Strengths and Limitations
We treat Nebraska as a case study of a more politically conservative state. Although not
nationally generalizable, Nebraska’s composition provides a good opportunity to examine
whether a backlash, especially among more politically conservative groups, results from the
Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage. It is also an instructive case study insofar as the
state is actually comparable to the rest of the nation when it comes to attitudes about LGBTQ
rights. In 2013, the majority of Nebraskans supported same-sex marriage and other LGBTQ
rights and Nebraskans’ opinions mirrored national public opinion on these issues (Stange and
Kazyak, 2016). Nebraska is also fairly average when it comes to measures of religiosity. A Pew
Research Study (2014) ranks it the 22nd most religious state, based on the percentage of residents
who say religion is very important in their lives (54 percent), that they attend worship services
weekly (39 percent), that they pray daily (52 percent), and that they believe in God with certainty
(69 percent). Additionally, the NASIS surveys are a good data source to assess if and how the
Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage impacts public opinion about LGB rights for a
number of reasons. The 2015 survey was fielded two months after the Supreme Court ruling,
which provides the opportunity to compare opinion pre- and post-ruling. Moreover, state-level
public opinion data on same-sex marriage and other LGB issues is quite rare (Becker, 2014;
Flores and Barclay, 2015, p. 2), making an analysis of data collected by the NASIS a unique
opportunity. Finally, being able to examine multiple LGB issues, instead of only same-sex
marriage, is a strength of NASIS data (Becker, 2014).
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Our findings, however, are only generalizable to the Nebraska context. The demographic,
makeup of Nebraska differs from other states in important ways, such as racial and ethnic
diversity; a more racially and ethnically diverse sample could result in more positive attitudes on
LGB rights related to discrimination yet more negative attitudes related to same-sex marriage
(Lewis, 2003; Moore 2010). Another consideration is that our data also come from two waves of
a longitudinal survey that had two separate, independent samples. A panel study with the same
respondents reporting their opinions of LGB issues before and after the ruling would provide a
more complete examination of how the ruling affected individuals’ opinions. Also, the 2015
wave was conducted very shortly following the Obergefell decision (the first mailing was sent on
August 12th and the decision was June 26th). Given that people’s attitudes about social and legal
changes may not shift simulteanously with the changes themselves, it could be that we did not
adequately capture negative sentiments just two months after the decision. Finally, it is important
to note that the survey did not ask questions about transgender rights. This is an important
limitation to highlight particulary given the degree to which scholars contend that hostility over
transgender rights and the introduction of “bathroom bills” reflects a backlash to increasing gains
of LGBT people, especially marriage equality. Indeed, research indicates less support for rights
for transgender people compared to gays and lesbians (Lewis et al., 2017). Despite these
limitations, our study uses a unique dataset from a more politically conservative state to
understand how the Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriage affects public opinion on this
and other LGB issues.

Analysis Plan

15

16
We first report descriptive results of Nebraskans’ opinions of same-sex marriage,
adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples, and protections for gay men and lesbians from
housing and job discrimination for 2013 and 2015. Using two-tailed t-tests, we examine if the
distribution of responses to these questions significantly differ between 2013 and 2015. Next, in
regression models (logistic for favor/oppose outcomes and multinomial for the nominal
outcomes of the same-sex marriage question–favor/favor civil unions only/oppose) using pooled
2013 and 2015 NASIS data (n=2,751), we examine if the Supreme Court ruling affected opinions
of LGB issues. The main independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of pre- (2013) or postruling (2015). Control variables in the models include respondent demographic, political, and
religious characteristics. Lastly, in additional regression models, we examine if opinions of
same-sex marriage significantly differed pre-/post-ruling for men, women, Democrats,
Republicans, Independents, those who do and do not identify as born again Christian, and those
who do and do not personally know an LGB person.
To answer our second research question, we use chi-square tests with the NASIS 2015
data to examine how people’s perceptions of the Court’s ruling reflecting marjority American
and Nebraskan opinion relates to their own opinions of same-sex marriage. For our third research
question, we use chi-square tests using NASIS 2015 data to examine if support for same-sex
marriage differs by how often people discuss LGB issues.
Weighting
For our analyses, we use weighted NASIS data with the corresponding svy commands in
Stata14. The data are weighted to account for within-household selection, unit nonresponse, and
population characteristics. The weights for both 2013 and 2015 were for household size and sex,
age, and region of Nebraska using 2010 US Census data (NASIS 2012-2013 Methodology
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Report; NASIS, 2014-2015 Methodology Report). Table 2 displays the weighted demographic,
political, and religious characteristics of the completed NASIS samples for 2013 and 2015. Ttests indicate no significant differences in respondent characteristics between the 2013 and 2015
data. One important exception is that more respondents in 2015 reported knowing an LGB
person than in 2013. We control for this in the regression models and also return to the
importance of this fact in the discussion in light of our other findings. The 2015 NASIS also
asked whether respondents heard or read about the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, and 92.6% of the
sample reported yes,1 meaning the vast majority of respondents were aware of the ruling.
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>

Findings
Table 2 shows the distribution of Nebraskans’ opinions of LGB issues for 2013 and 2015.
Support for all four LGB issues that we examined—same-sex marriage, adoption by gay and
lesbian couples, and protections from discrimination in housing and employment—was
nominally higher in 2015 than 2013 indicating there was not a backlash to the Court’s decision in
terms of public opinion. T-tests show that significantly more Nebraskans favored same-sex
marriage in 2015 than 2013 (40.5% vs. 48.04%; t=-3.13, p<0.01) and significantly more
Nebraskans favored policies to protect LGB people from housing discrimination in 2015 than
2013 (71.78% vs. 77.10%; t=-2.55, p<0.05). Differences in opinions between 2013 and 2015

1. A logistic regression model showed that people from Omaha and Lincoln and those who know
an LGB person were significantly more likely to have heard about the ruling. No other
demographic, political, or religious characteristics were statistically significant in the model,
suggesting that other subgroups did not differ in the likelihood that they heard about the ruling.
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were not statistically significant regarding adoption rights for gay and lesbian couples and
policies to protect LGB people from job discrimination.
As seen in table 3, the indicator of pre-/post-Court ruling was statistically significant in
the multinomial regression model predicting views of same-sex marriage by demographic,
political, and religious characteristics of respondents (favor vs. oppose: Relative Risk Ratio
[RRR]=1.63). This finding suggests that the Court’s ruling contributed to changes in public
opinion even when controlling for demographic, political, and religious characteristics of
respondents. Consistent with the t-tests, additional logistic regression models show that the pre/post-Court ruling indicator was not statistically significant for views on adoption rights for gay
and lesbian couples and policies to protect LGB people from job discrimination. Support,
however, was significantly higher for policies to protect LGB people from housing
discrimination in 2015 than 2013, even when controlling for respondent demographic, political,
and religious characteristics. Results of models predicting opinions of non-marriage LGB issues
are available upon request.
In each regression model, the demographic, political, and religious characteristics of
respondents were associated with views of the LGB issues in ways that are consistent with past
research. For example, women, younger people, people with higher education levels, political
liberals, and less religious individuals were significantly more supportive of LGB rights. In
addition, respondents who live in Omaha and Lincoln – Nebraska’s two largest urban areas –
were significantly more supportive of LGB rights than their counterparts in the less urban parts
of the state. This result likely stems from residents of Omaha and Lincoln reporting, on average,
significantly higher education levels, lower levels of religious identification, and identifying
more as Democrats compared to respondents from the rest of the state. For example, 79.5% of
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Omaha and Lincoln residents identified as religious while 89.2% of people in the rest of
Nebraska identified as religious (t=-5.04, p<0.001).
Similar to the findings reported in table 2, the indicator of pre-/post-ruling was
statistically significant in the logistic regression model predicting support for policies to protect
LGB people from housing discrimination (β=0.344, p=0.009) but not in the models predicting
support for adoption by gay and lesbian couples (β=0.223, p=0.079) or policies to protect LGB
people from job discrimination (β=0.226, p=0.106). For each of these models, respondent
demographic, political, and religious characteristics were associated with support of LGB
policies in ways that are consistent with past research. For example, women were signifincatly
more likely to support all LGB policies compared to men. Full model results available upon
request.
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>
Separate multinomial regression models for specific demographic, political, and religious
groups show that opinions of same-sex marriage significantly differed before and after the Court
ruling for some, but not all, groups (we do not report these tables due to space consideration, but
they are available upon request). Similar to the trend among all respondents, in comparison to
opposing same-sex marriage, support of same-sex marriage was significantly higher in 2015 than
in 2013 for women (RRR=2.04, p<0.001), Democrats (RRR=2.41, p=0.004), Independents/other
political party (RRR=2.28, p=0.008) and for respondents who do not identify as born again
Christian (RRR=1.52, p=0.029) and for respondents who do not know an LGB person
(RRR=2.04, p<0.001). Conversely, there was no significant difference in views of same-sex
marriage between 2013 and 2015 for men (RRR=1.49, p=0.123) and Republicans (RRR=1.48,
p=0.143), and those who know an LGB person (RRR=1.48, p=0.138).

19

20
The change in views of same-sex marriage between 2013 and 2015 by gender, political
party, born again Christian identity, and knowing a LGB person is evident in Table 4 which
shows the distribution of opinions for these groups in 2013 and 2015. For example, while 44.2%
of women favored same-sex marriage in 2013, significantly more women (52.8%) favored it in
2015. Among men, however, 37.0% favored same-sex marriage in 2013 and 43.4% favored in
2015, which was not a statistically significant increase. The differences among political parties is
even more pronounced. In 2013, 64.4% of Democrats favored same-sex marriage, which
significantly increased to 73.8% in 2015. Similarly, among Independents and those affiliated
with other political parties, support for same-sex marriage significantly increased from 47.2% in
2013 to 62.0% in 2015. The change between 2013 and 2015, however, was not statistically
significant among Republicans: 19.9% favored same-sex marriage in 2013 and 24.3% favored it
in 2015. Support increased between 2013 and 2015, though, among born again Christians (16.8%
vs. 25.6%; t=-2.23, p=0.026) and those who do not identify as born again Christian (49.4% vs.
56.8%; t=-2.56, p=0.011. Finally, 58.3% of those who reported knowing an LGB person in 2013
favored same-sex marriage while 60.8% favored it in 2015, which is not a significant increase
(t=-0.74, p=0.462); however, people who do not know an LGB person became significantly more
supportive of same-sex marriage between 2013 and 2015 (25.3% vs. 33.7%; t-2.66, p=0.008).
Overall, these findings suggest that support for same-sex marriage increased significantly
among groups that have historically supported same-sex marriage at higher levels, while
support/opposition was unchanged among groups that have historically been less supportive of
same-sex marriage. Combined with the findings among all respondents, these data suggest there
was not a backlash of public opinion in response to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling on same-sex
marriage. Support increased among some groups and remained unchanged among others.
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<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>
Our next set of analyses examine respondents’ perceptions of the Supreme Court
decision. Specificallly, we look at whether Nebraskans believe that the court’s ruling reflects the
opinions of Americans and the opinions of Nebraskans. As seen in Table 5, views of same sexmarriage significantly differs by how well respondents think the Court’s ruling reflects the
opinion of a majority of Americans (X2(6)=720.03, p<0.001). Specifically, 95.0% of those who
think the ruling reflects American opinion very well favor same-sex marriage, while 89.5% of
those who think the opinion does not at all reflect American opinion oppose same-sex marriage.
With regard to perceptions about Nebraskan public opinion, similar results emerge (table 6;
X2(6)=450.41, p<0.001). These findings support the false consensus effect hypothesis.
<INSERT TABLE 5>
Finally, we assess whether there is an association between talking about gay and lesbian
issues and support for same-sex marriage. Our results indicate that those who talk about gay and
lesbian issues very often are more likely to favor same-sex marriage, while those who never talk
about gay and lesbian issues are more likely to oppose same-sex marriage (table 6; X2(6)=56.36,
p<0.001). Specifically, 69.2% percent of those people who reported talking about gay and
lesbian issues very often reported that they support same-sex marriage, but only 28.9% of people
who reported never talking about LGB issues reported that they favored same-sex marriage. In
comparison, only 24.4% of people who said they talk about gay and lesbian issues very often
said that they opposed same-sex marriage and 52.2% of respondents who said they never talk
about gay and lesbian issues report that they opposed same-sex marriage. Although our results
show a strong association, more research is needed to determine the causal direction between
support for same-sex marriage and talking about LGB issues.
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<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE>

Discussion
Our results indicate support for the positive response or legitimacy hypothesis of how the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges affected public opinion of LGB issues. We
observed a significant increase in support for same-sex marriage among Nebraskans from 2013
to 2015. Additionally, we found that even when controlling for respondent demographic,
political, and religious characteristics, there was a significant increase in support for same-sex
marriage from 2013 to 2015. This finding suggests that the court had an influence on public
opinion and, specifically, that public opinion shifted to be aligned with the Court’s decision.
Moreover, our findings also support the structural response hypothesis insofar as the groups who
tended to be pro-LGB rights became significantly more supportive of same-sex marriage, while
other groups did not change significantly between years. For instance, women reported
significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage, whereas men’s opinions remained
statistically the same. Interestingly, we found that those who reported not knowing a LGB person
(i.e. a group whose opinions we would expect either to not change or to become more negative)
in fact reported significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage in 2015 than in
2013.
We found no support for the backlash hypothesis. There was not an increase in
opposition to same-sex marriage among Nebraskans following the Supreme Court ruling in
2015. It is important to note that a backlash of public opinion did not occur even among groups
who tend to be less supportive of same-sex marriage historically, such as born again Christians
and Republicans. Moreover, we did not find an increase in opposition to other LGB rights issues
(such as housing or employment protections). Our findings contrast previous research that did
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show that public opinion on LGB rights became more negative following the Supreme Court
ruling that decriminalized same-sex sex (Lawrence v. Texas) (Engel, 2013; Stoutenborough,
Haider-Markel, and Allen, 2006). The difference may reflect the extent to which media coverage
following the 2015 marriage ruling was more positive than the coverage following the 2003
sodomy ruling insofar as media coverage plays an important role in shaping how the public
responds to Supreme Court decisions (Linos & Twist, 2016). It may also reflect the degree to
which the Lawrence v. Texas ruling explicitly dealt with sexual relations in a way that the
marriage ruling did not. We cannot assess these questions with the current study, but they
warrant attention in future research. Future research could also analyze how born again
Christians make sense of same-sex marriage and other LGB issues and what leads to some
supporting such issues (Gjelten and Peñaloza, 2016). Additionally, the fact that there was an
increase in support for same-sex marriage from people who reported not knowing an LGB
person (also a group associated with lower level of support) raises questions that can be
addressed in future research.
Despite the increase in support for same-sex marriage and lack of backlash, it is
nonetheless important to note that we did not find an increase in support for other issues (with
the exception of policies to protect LGB people from housing discrimination). This may indicate
that, as some scholars predicted, the narrow focus on marriage means that the public will not see
the importance of other issues and thus the embrace of marriage will not extend to support of
other gay rights (GLAAD, 2016; Pew Research, 2013b; Walters, 2014). It could be that if
activists are able to utilize similar strategies to make visible the negative impact of not having
employment protections, for instance, we would see increasing support of these other issues with
time. At the very least, our findings echo other research and point to the importance of

23

24
recognizing that there are differing levels of support depending on which LGB right is in
question and offers a caution that the public’s support for same-sex marriage will not
automatically translate into support for other LGB rights (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Powell et al.,
2010). Yet, related to another facet that scholars have debated with respect to the impact of
same-sex marriage, we also find that there was an increase in the number of people who reported
knowing an LGB person from 2013 to 2015. In light of this finding, research should continue to
address how increasing legal protections translates into visibility of LGBQ people and
relationships (Bernstein, 2015; Kimport, 2014).
Our analyses did reveal differences in how people perceived the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Specifically, we found that the group of people who believe that the ruling reflects American and
Nebraskan opinion very well are more likely to support same-sex marriage. In a similar vein,
those who think that the ruling does not at all reflect the country or Nebraskan public opinion are
more likely to oppose same-sex marriage. These findings are consistent with prior literature on
the “false consensus effect” (Krueger and Clement, 1994) as each group assumes that their
opinion aligns with the majority opinion. One implication of this finding is that people who are
unsupportive of gay rights may view the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling as indicative of the
Supreme Court members being liberal elites who are out of touch with the general public’s
sentiments regarding same-sex marriage (Irvine, 2005; Kazyak, 2011). Such a sense might
dovetail with the sentiment that gays and lesbians are gaining rights at the expense of what the
“real” Americans (understood as heterosexual) value (Baretto et al., 2011; Parker & Baretto,
2013).
This implication is particularly important to consider in light our last finding that those
who oppose same-sex marriage are more likely to never talk about gay rights issues. Scholars
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who stress the importance of the communicative process in forming public opinion note that
interacting and having dialogue with others not only shapes a person’s own perspective, but that
it also may give that person a better understanding of others’ perspectives. In this way,
communicating about a social issue may lessen the tendency to conflate your personal opinion
with the opinion of the general public (Wojcieszak and Price, 2009). With the case of same-sex
marriage, the majority of Americans in fact do support the right for same-sex couples to marry.
Thus, despite the fact that of course not everyone agrees on the issue of same-sex marriage, the
court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges is aligned with the majority of American’s and
Nebraskan’s viewpoints. Those who do not talk about gay and lesbian issues and who are
unsupportive of same-sex marriage may not have a good understanding of what other people’s
perspectives actually are; they therefore may mistakenly assume that more people than actually
do share their viewpoint and thus perceive that the court’s ruling is not aligned with the majority
of American and Nebraskan opinion. The lack of dialogue about gay and lesbian issues among
all Americans may perpetuate the misunderstanding of public opinion about same-sex marriage
and thus the misunderstanding about whether the court was or was not aligned with the majority
of the public. The degree to which these sentiments may continue to emerge and coalesce among
some groups of people and anti-LGBT activists would mean that more negative opinions or
backlash could be seen in future waves of the survey.
The findings that there was not a backlash in term of public opinion against same-sex
marriage and other LGB issues among Nebraskans following Obergefell v. Hodges are also
interesting to consider in light of recent legislation that critics argue repeal and reverse gains
made with regard to LGBT rights (Epps 2016; Stern 2016). For instance, Mississippi and North
Carolina have passed laws that allows business owners to deny services to individuals based on
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the owner’s religious views. Discussion of these bills are often framed around the rhetoric of
“religious freedom” and some argue that their passage reflects opposition to the Supreme Court
case extending marriage recognition for same-sex couples (Bauerlein and Kamp, 2016). Indeed,
the Mississippi bill specifically outlines that business owners are able to deny wedding services
to same-sex couples based on their religious beliefs (Stern, 2016). Likewise, the issue of
transgender individuals and bathroom use has taken center stage in much of the debate of
legislation passed in North Carolina and introduced in other states (Bauerlein, 2016). Thus, it is
important for future research to address how public opinion on same-sex marriage may or may
not align with how the public makes sense of other issues affecting LGBT individuals,
particularly transgender rights. Moreover, the introduction and passage of anti-LGBT legislation
following Obergefell reflects a backlash that is distinct from public opinion. Future work should
focus on how state legislatures are successful in passing such legislation, especially if it passes
despite a lack of public support.
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Table 1: Wording of NASIS questions about LGB legal rights.
Response
Options

Question
Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to legally
marry?

Favor
Favor Civil Unions only
Oppose

Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt
children?

Favor
Oppose

Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gay men and lesbians from
housing discrimination?

Favor
Oppose

Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gay men and lesbians from
job discrimination?

Favor
Oppose

Have you heard or read about the June 2015 Supreme Court ruling
concerning same-sex marriage?

Yes
No

How often would you say you talk to your family members,
relatives, neighbors, coworkers, or close friends about gay and
lesbian issues?

Very often
Often
Sometimes
Never

How well do you think the Supreme Court’s decision reflects what
the majority of Americans think about same-sex marriage?

How well do you think the Supreme Court’s decisions reflects what
the majority of Nebraskans think about same-sex marriage?

Very well
Well
Not well
Not at all
Very well
Well
Not well
Not at all
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Table 2: Characteristics of NASIS respondents (weighted percentages).
2013

2015

T-Value

50.86
49.14

50.77
49.23

-0.06
0.06

4.98
17.11
34.05
25.40
18.46

0.76
-.16
-1.63
1.91
-0.19

17.53
35.08
47.39

0.98
0.58
-1.27

26.52
45.11
28.37*

-0.17
-1.70
1.98

3.96
16.15
39.46
30.59
9.84

0.07
0.12
-0.92
0.82
0.06

27.43
72.56

-0.44
0.44

96.23
3.77

-1.03
1.03

52.81*
47.19*

2.52
-2.52

Sex
Female
Male
Age
6.00
19-24
16.77
25-34
30.10
35-49
28.93
50-64
18.20
65+
Education
19.01
HS or <
36.26
Some College
44.74
BA+
Political Party
25.69
Democrat
41.23
Republican
33.08*
Independent
Political Ideology
3.98
Very Liberal
16.07
Liberal
37.78
Moderate
32.51
Conservative
9.67
Very Conservative
Born-Again Christian
26.01
Yes
73.99
No
Sexual Orientation
96.75
Non-LGB
3.25
LGB
Know LGB Person
46.72*
Yes
53.28*
No
Heard about Obergefell v. Hodges Ruling
Yes
No
Same-Sex Marriage
Favor
40.54
Favor Civil Unions Only
19.28
Oppose
40.19
Adoption by Gay and Lesbian Couples
Favor
55.87
Oppose
44.13
Protection from Housing Discrimination
Favor
71.78
Oppose
28.22
Protection from Job Discrimination
Favor
74.54
Oppose
25.46
Note. *Indicates p<0.05 difference between 2013 and 2015 **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

92.60
7.40
48.04
16.72
35.24

-3.13**
1.41
2.18*

58.95
41.05

-1.30
1.30

77.10
22.90

-2.55*
2.55*

78.41
21.59

-1.90
1.90
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Table 3: Multinomial regression model predicting views of same-sex marriage by respondent characteristics
and controlling for experimental treatments.
Favor Civil Unions Onlya
Favor Same-Sex Marraigea
Relative
Relative Risk
SE
SE
Risk Ratio
Ratio
1.63**
0.27
0.99
0.16
Pre-/Post-Ruling (2013=0, 2015=1)
2.18***
0.36
2.19***
0.35
Live in Omaha/Lincoln (Yes=1, No=0)
0.48***
.08
0.69*
0.11
Sex (Male=1, Female=0)
Age
19-24 (Reference)
0.56
0.38
0.41
0.27
25-34
0.21*
0.14
0.41
0.26
35-49
0.15**
0.10
0.37
0.23
50-64
0.12**
0.08
0.32
0.20
65+
Education
HS or < (Reference)
1.47
0.37
1.11
0.27
Some College
2.71***
0.71
2.02**
0.51
BA+
Political Party
Democrat (Reference)
0.35***
0.08
0.72
Republican
0.60*
0.13
0.82
Independent/Other
Political Ideology
1.36
0.85
0.52
Very Liberal
1.80*
0.49
0.59
Liberal
Moderate (Reference)
0.29***
0.06
0.87
Conservative
0.11***
0.05
0.29***
Very Conservative
0.50
0.18
0.68
Religion (Yes=1, None=0)
0.37***
0.07
0.54**
Born-Again Christian (Yes=1, No=0)
Religious Attendance
Several Times a Week (Reference)
Once a Week
0.93
0.44
0.88
Nearly Every Week
1.26
0.63
0.88
About once a month
4.23**
2.36
1.37
Several times a year
3.12*
1.58
1.03
About once a year
3.44*
1.98
1.76
Less than once a year
4.88**
2.83
1.88
Never
4.32*
2.47
1.62
Religious Influence
Very Much (Reference)
Quite a Bit
1.62*
0.35
1.58*
Some
2.76***
0.77
1.72
A Little
1.49
0.57
0.94
None
1.98
0.91
0.70
3.38***
0.58
2.04***
Know LGB Person (Yes=1, No=0)
1.03
0.87
0.23
Sexual Orientation (LGB=1, Non-LGB=0)
2.77
2.48
1.26
Intercept
Note. a”Oppose” is the base outcome. N=2,170. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

0.17
0.19
0.39
0.20
0.16
0.09
0.29
0.10
0.29
0.32
0.59
0.39
0.78
0.82
0.76
0.32
0.42
0.35
0.38
0.34
0.26
1.06
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Table 4. Views of same-sex marriage pre- and post-Supreme Court ruling by sex, political party affiliation,
and Born Again Christian identity (weighted percentages).
Favor

Civil Unions Only

Oppose

2013

2015

T-value

2013

2015

T-value

2013

2015

T-value

Female

44.2

52.8

-2.92**

19.4

17.3

0.90

36.4

29.9

2.39*

Male

37.0

43.4

-1.65

19.3

16.2

1.10

43.7

40.4

0.86

Democrat

64.4

73.8

-2.39*

15.0

7.4

2.81**

20.6

18.9

0.54

Republican

19.9

24.3

-1.37

22.6

24.5

-0.59

57.5

51.3

1.67

Independent

47.2

62.0

-3.32***

19.7

13.4

1.85

33.1

24.2

2.27*

Yes

16.8

25.6

-2.23*

19.4

14.7

1.29

63.8

59.7

0.89

No

49.4

56.8

-2.56*

19.1

17.7

0.66

31.5

25.6

2.34*

Yes

58.3

60.8

-0.74

19.0

16.7

0.85

22.7

22.4

0.09

No

25.3

33.7

-2.66**

19.6

16.9

1.11

55.0

49.4

1.69

Sex

Political Party

Born-AgainChristian

Know LGB Person

Note. N=2,170; *Indicates p<0.05 difference between 2013 and 2015 **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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Table 5. Views of same-sex marriage by how well respondents think Supreme Court ruling reflects majority
public opinion, weighted percentages (NASIS 2015).

Favor

View of Same-Sex Marriage
Favor
Civil Unions Only
Oppose

X2
(p-value)

Reflects Majority American Opinion
Very well

95.0

1.9

3.1

Well

78.7

13.3

8.0

Somewhat

14.0

30.0

56.0

Not at all

0.5

10.0

89.5

Very well

83.7

2.3

14.0

Well

86.6

8.7

4.7

Somewhat

41.3

23.7

35

Not at all

5.5

13.97

80.5

720.03
(<0.001)

Reflects Majority Nebraskan Opinion
450.41
(<0.001)
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Table 6. Views of same-sex marriage by how often respondents talk about gay and lesbian
issues.
View of Same-Sex Marriage
X2
(p-value)
Favor
Favor Civil Unions Only
Oppose
69.2
6.4
24.4
Very often
59.9
12.0
28.1
Often
56.36
(<0.001)
42.7
18.6
38.8
Sometimes
28.9
18.9
52.2
Never
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